Thursday, July 2, 2015

Macro-Prudential regulations have failed for 90 years


Mainstream economists, excluding those at the Bank for International Settlements, have stuck with their ancient superstition that recessions are random events, each with its own special cause, known technically as shocks that send the economy spinning out of equilibrium. Central bankers and politicians along with the mainstream media have rounded up the usual suspects, bankers, and sentenced them without a trial.

The general opinion seems to be that bankers were either too stupid or dishonest while making loans in the past so they made a lot of bad loans and conjured from hell the worst recession since the Great Depression. The guilty verdict requires that Basel and Washington control even more of the decision making process in what has come to be called “macro-prudential” regulations.

Monday, June 22, 2015

This ratio signals recessions and inequality

In past articles I have reviewed sound models signaling the Fed’s money printing has made the economic expansion unsustainable. Those included Spitznagel’s Misesian Index, Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings (CAPE) ratio, and others. I just discovered a new one, the ratio of asset prices to income.

I found the ratio in a report on inequality of wealth in the world published by the Credit Suisse Research Institute. Referring to the ratio, the report says on page six:
...the ratio is now at a recent record high level of 6.5, matched previously only during the Great Depression. This is a worrying signal given that abnormally high wealth income ratios have always signaled recession in the past.

Thursday, June 11, 2015

Mainstream economists have learning disorder

After the onset of the Great Depression, many economists radically changed their views and adopted Keynes’ “revolution,” which was not a revolution but merely a resurrection of mercantile economics. Mainstream economists don’t understand that because they don’t take economic history in school. Keynesian economics dominated until the stagflation of the 1970’s.

Responding to their mistakes of the 70s, mainstream abandoned paleo-Keynesian economics and the profession split into the New Keynesian, monetarist and neo-classical schools of macroeconomics, though hard-to-kill paleo-Keynesian econ lives on in the writings of Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman. The three new schools rejected Keynes’ idea of having the state micromanage the economy through fiscal policy because they recognized it suffered from the three lags, cogitation, formulation and implementation. In other words, the state always shows up late to the economic “accident” because it’s slow to recognize the problem, slower to formulate policy and tardy in implementing the policy. As a result, fiscal policy tended to make things worse.

Thursday, June 4, 2015

The bond market's head fake

The bond market fell this week, wiping out gains for the year. Some blame it on Mario Draghi’s comments after an ECB meeting in which he expressed indifference to volatility in bond markets. If it is true that Draghi’s statements motivated the selloff, it shows how fragile is an investing philosophy that is based solely on what central banks do. Such investors are terrified of rising interest rates but want to remain fully invested until the last bell. Of course, anyone investing in bonds or stocks at these altitudes should be as nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs.

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Why the Fed won't raise rates


The VIX (volatility index) is in a coma, so most investors are dozing while danger signs about the current stock market pop up. The idea that the Fed causes recessions by raising interest rates has relaxed many investors. Some writers have assured nervous investors that it won’t be until the Fed’s third rate increase that the market will respond.

In this previous post, I used Hayek’s Ricardo Effect to explain that recessions can happen without rising interest rates. Now, Hoisington Investment management adds support for Hayek from a different perspective. In the Quarterly Review and Outlook for the first quarter of this year, Hoisington wrote about the financial histories of nations with over-indebted economies. That history goes back two thousand years, but the US has suffered through four such seizures in the 1830-40s, 1860-70s, 1920-30s and the past two decades. The report offers six characteristics of excessive debt:

Thursday, May 21, 2015

Corporate buybacks keep market airborne




The stock market has surged lately and a lot of analysts credit it to stock buybacks by corporations. As the chart here shows, buybacks have reached dizzying heights. Corporations are purchasing their own stocks because corporate profits hit record levels last year and management can find no better use for the cash than to give it back to the owners through larger dividends or buybacks.

As I wrote recently, record corporate profits, the current level of optimism and the low yields on debt justify the current loftiness of the market. This is not a bubble, but most investors are wondering what will shoot down this high flying market? Corporations appear to be the last buyers standing because “mutual fund managers have the lowest cash levels in history and money market fund levels are lower now than in 2007 and near a record low from 2000 relative to the capitalization of the stock market."

Wednesday, May 13, 2015

Bitcoin won't save us

Libertarians have waxed poetic about bitcoin for years. It pokes a finger in the eye of the state by breaking the state’s monopoly on money and rescues citizens from a rapidly eroding dollar. But aside from the block chain innovation and its potential use in other industries, I can’t get excited about bitcoin. Other than symbolic, what advantage does bitcoin offer?

Say you produce oil field equipment in Tulsa and made a big sale to a production company in Marrakech, Morocco and to make the sale you offered them 90 days of credit. Also, you’re local sales rep made the deal in Moroccan dirhams. So you’re worried that in the 90 days before you get paid that the value of the dirham will depreciate against the dollar (that is, it will buy fewer dollars) and you’ll lose money on the deal.